NSW Court clarifies meaning of "lawfully used or occupied" in Aboriginal Land Rights Act
12 June 2024
12 June 2024
The Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 (NSW) (ALR Act) adds complexity to proposals to access land within its scope. It is more difficult to navigate than the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
The ALR Act has generated much litigation around the definitions of land required to be transferred to land councils under the scheme.
The latest judicial consideration is by the Land and Environment Court of NSW, which recently looked at the meaning of "lawfully used or occupied" in the definition of "claimable Crown land".
Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Land Management Act 2016 [2023] NSWLEC 134 concerned an appeal from the Minister's refusal of the Darkinjung Local Aboriginal Land Council's 2019 land claim over land in Doyalson.
The Minister refused the claim on the basis that the land was subject to a special lease issued in 1967 which the Minister said remained in force at the date of the claim. The Land Council successfully appealed.
The Court considered the definition of "claimable Crown lands" in section 36 of the ALR Act. It relevantly defines "claimable Crown lands" as follows: "claimable Crown lands means lands vested in Her Majesty that, when a claim is made for the lands under this Division — … are not lawfully used or occupied".
There was no argument made in support of lawful use, because the use of the land was obviously unlawful. The Court found that the land was not, in fact, occupied at the time of the claim (lawfully or unlawfully) and was therefore "claimable Crown land".
In 1967, the claimed land was leased to a Mr Graham under a special lease for the purpose of a poultry farm. The Minister later approved an extension of the special lease for the purpose of "poultry farm and hatchery" to expire in December 1996.
In 1993, Mr Graham applied to purchase the land. It seems that because of this undetermined application, after its term expired in 1996, the lease was "kept current on a month by month basis until a determination is made".
From the mid-1980s, there was evidence that Mr Graham was using the claimed land for purposes other than a poultry farm. In 1985 he was fined for illegal removal of fill (quarrying) in breach of the special lease. Another conviction followed in 2003 relating to use of the site as a landfill to dispose of waste material from Mr Graham's demolition business on the adjacent property and breach of various EPA notices. There was also evidence that Mr Graham sublet the land to third parties for purposes outside of the lease purpose.
The application to purchase the land was not determined before the land claim was made in 2019.
The Court noted that a statutory precondition to the creation of a new monthly tenure under the Crown Lands (Continued Tenures) Act 1989 (NSW) after the expiry of the special lease was the grant of the Minister’s consent.
There was no evidence that consent had been granted, notwithstanding that the Department proceeded on the assumption that Mr Graham had a monthly tenure (and rent was paid). The Court rejected the Minister's argument that consent was implied from conduct.
The Court held that the Ministerial consent requires active engagement with the question of whether the holder of an expired special lease for a term ought to remain in possession of the land on a monthly tenancy. Further, it must be given prior to the commencement of the periodic tenancy.
This issue became important later in the decision.
The Court summarised the relevant legal principles as follows:
While the matter was decided reasonably simply on the facts, the Court examined several conflicting authorities on the concept of "lawfulness".
The High Court held in New South Wales Aboriginal Land Council v Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act [2016] HCA 50; (2016) 260 CLR 232 (Berrima Gaol) that for use of land to be lawful, it had to conform to the purpose for which dedicated. However, lawful occupation does not require this. To do so would deny distinction between use and occupation. That is, land does not need to be actively used for dedicated purposes to be lawfully occupied.
The Court in this case noted this example, "a tenant may be in lawful occupation of land subject to a lease, even though the tenant carries out unlawful activities on the land".
There was ample evidence of Mr Graham occupying the land until mid-2018, but no evidence was led about the period from mid-2018 until the date of the claim in 2019. The Court drew an adverse inference from the fact that the Minister did not lead evidence from Mr Graham as to his occupation at the relevant date.
The Court said that:
While a continuous physical presence over the entirety of the land is not necessary to demonstrate occupation, and total abandonment is not required to find that the land is not occupied, there remains a six-month evidential gap where the Minister has failed to establish actual occupation of almost all the land as at the date of the claim.
The Minister relied upon the continual payment of rent to show occupation of the land. The Court said that the payment of rent is no more than evidence of legal possession and not actual possession and not sufficient for section 36(1)(b) of the ALR Act.
The Court concluded that the Minister had not discharged the statutory onus of proof of demonstrating that there was actual occupation of the claimed land by Graham as at the claim date.
Notwithstanding this, the Court went on to consider whether, if occupation had been established, it was lawful considering the illegal activities being carried out upon it.
The evidence in this case disclosed that Mr Graham was not using or occupying the land for purpose of the lease. In fact, the evidence strongly supported a finding of unlawful use insofar as the land was being used as a waste disposal site, was subject to contaminants, had been sublet to third parties and had been subjected to unlawful clearing and construction.
The Court rejected the Land Council's argument that lawful occupation is constricted to the narrow purpose of the subject-matter of special lease, namely, as a poultry farm and hatchery. As the High Court stated in Berrima Gaol, to constrict the composite term “lawfully…occupied” in this way is to effectively conflate the concepts of lawful use and lawful occupation in a manner that was not intended by their distinct and separate identification in section 36(1)(b) of the ALR Act.
So, the unlawful use did not render the occupation unlawful, but what was the nature of that occupation?
The Court held that:
A new periodic monthly lease arose by reason of Mr Graham’s continued occupation of the claimed land, his continued payment of rent … and the continued knowledge by the Crown Lands Office and various State departments of his occupation and use of the land … after [the special lease] expired.
Where a tenant remains in occupation after the expiry of a lease for a term, which does not contain provision for the holding over, a new agreement is implied. The terms and conditions of the original lease, so far as relevant, are imported into this new agreement.
Therefore, at common law, Mr Graham held a lawful right to occupy the claimed land. This was so, irrespective of the fact that as at the claim date the land was no longer being used for the purpose for which it was leased, in breach of that lease.
However, none of this assisted the Minister to defeat the claim. The Court referred to the "almost sacrosanct nature of the prohibition on the dealing with Crown lands other than in accordance with the Crown lands statutory regime". It concluded that because the month-by-month tenancy arrangement did not conform with the requirements of the Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW), Mr Graham's occupation was unlawful for the purposes of the ALR Act.
The land was therefore claimable Crown land and should be granted to the Land Council under the ALR Act.
Authors: Joel Moss, Counsel; Leonie Flynn, Expertise Counsel and Benjamin Cranley, Lawyer.
The information provided is not intended to be a comprehensive review of all developments in the law and practice, or to cover all aspects of those referred to.
Readers should take legal advice before applying it to specific issues or transactions.